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Note 
 
Healthy Compromise: Reconciling Wellness 
Program Financial Incentives with Health 
Reform 
Heather Baird*
Soaring health care expenditures
 
1 coupled with plummet-
ing insurance coverage2 suggest something is seriously wrong 
with the American health care system. In 2010, President 
Barack Obama and Congress responded with the passage of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)—redesigning 
the health care system to increase access to affordable health 
insurance and care for all Americans.3
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State University, Bozeman. A heartfelt thank you goes out to Professors Dan-
iel Schwarcz and Amy Monahan for all of their assistance, insight, and time; 
the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their effort and dedica-
tion; and to every friend and family member who has patiently tolerated 
and encouraged me during these four long years. My parents, Beth and Jo-
seph Baird, deserve special recognition for their truly unconditional love and 
support (and for the occasional provision of groceries and other essentials via 
interstate mail) throughout this graduate school adventure—I cannot thank 
them enough. Copyright © 2013 by Heather Baird.  
 One way that the ACA 
 1. Total health care expenditures in 2011 continued to grow. In 2011, 
health care spending totaled $2.7 trillion, which is 17.9% of the Gross Domes-
tic Product. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EX-
PENDITURES 2011 HIGHLIGHTS 1, available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ 
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf; CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2010–2020, 
at para. 4, available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and 
-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/ 
downloads/proj2010.pdf (“By 2020, national health spending is expected to 
reach $4.6 trillion and comprise 19.8% of GDP.”).  
 2. In 2010, there were 49.9 million uninsured Americans compared to 45 
million uninsured in 2008. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-239, INCOME, POVERTY, 
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 23 
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf. 
 3. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to a Joint 
Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009) (“[Health reform] will pro-
vide more security and stability to those who have health insurance. It will 
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proposes to control health care costs is through support for em-
ployee wellness program initiatives.4 While wellness programs 
existed prior to the ACA, the Act encourages large employers to 
adopt wellness programs as a means to decrease health care 
costs.5 These programs control costs by persuading employees 
to adopt healthier, and hopefully medically cheaper, lifestyles.6
Wellness programs may be structured to incentivize partic-
ipation in activities like educational sessions.
  
7 They may also 
be structured to incentivize the attainment of certain health 
outcomes, like a desirable blood pressure or cholesterol level.8 
The incentives themselves can be as simple as a gym member-
ship or the opportunity to participate in classes, but they also 
may be more economically valuable.9 For example, the ACA po-
tentially more than doubles the premium discount available to 
participants who achieve desirable health status indicators.10 
Employers and insurers are now permitted to provide rewards 
potentially worth up to 50% of a successful employee-
participant’s health insurance premium.11
Curbing health care costs is doubtlessly important.
 This Note concerns 
this type of financially incented program.  
12
 
provide insurance for those who don’t. And it will slow the growth of health 
care costs for our families, our businesses, and our government.”). 
 But 
wellness programs risk creating unproductive financial barriers 
to health care by using health insurance to single out and dis-
criminate against individuals with poor health statuses. This 
 4. The ACA defines a wellness program as “a program offered by an em-
ployer that is designed to promote health or prevent disease.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg-4(j) (Supp. 2012).  
 5. See Kristin M. Madison et al., The Law, Policy, and Ethics of Employ-
ers’ Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450, 
451 (2011) (“The [ACA] both reflects and promotes growing interest in employ-
er incentive programs.”). 
 6. Id. at 453. 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(2)(E).  
 8. See Madison et al., supra note 5, at 451. 
 9. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(1)(i)–(v), (2)(i) (2006). For example, a well-
ness plan may encourage preventative care by waiver of copayments for pre-
natal care or well-baby visits, or provide for economic rewards of up to 20% of 
the cost of coverage under the plan in exchange for participating in the pro-
gram. Id. 
 10. See Madison et al., supra note 5, at 462.  
 11. While the ACA prescribes a 30% value limit, it allows the maximum 
value to be raised to 50% at the discretion of the Secretaries of Labor, Health 
and Human Services, and the Treasury. Id. at 451. 
 12. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer et al., Confronting the Growing Burden 
of Chronic Disease: Can the U.S. Health Care Workforce Do the Job?, 28 
HEALTH AFF. 64, 64 (2009).  
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Note challenges the popular sentiment that these programs are 
a promising solution to the issues of unhealthy employees and 
expensive health care.13 It suggests that financially incented 
wellness programs are ill-suited to achieve the dual aim of im-
proving health and saving money because the legal and policy 
tensions these programs create threaten to undermine the 
ACA’s goal of promoting health and preventing disease.14
Wellness programs structured to incentivize health by 
providing financial rewards for healthy outcomes are problem-
atic on two levels. First, the discriminatory nature of the pro-
gram requirements potentially conflict with existing statutes, 
namely, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
 
15 
Second, the wellness provisions are in tension with the purpose 
of wellness programs generally, as well as with the broader 
purpose of the ACA.16 These problems will be exacerbated if the 
ACA is successful in increasing the number of employers offer-
ing significant financial rewards to healthy employees through 
wellness programs.17
Part I of this Note gives some background on health insur-
ance, discusses wellness programs under HIPAA and the ACA, 
and explains the evolution of wellness programs in American 
insurance schemes. Part II examines how the ACA’s wellness 
provisions conflict with existing laws and how the provisions 
are internally inconsistent. Part III concludes with some ideas 
about how the ACA’s wellness provisions can be improved to 
better balance the statutory objectives of promoting healthy liv-
ing without unduly burdening the unhealthy. Suggestions in-
clude remedying confusing statutory language and taking a 
more conservative approach to implementing programs with 
significant financial incentives through controlled pilot pro-
  
 
 13. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health 
Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks 
and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 299–301 (2012) (describing large employer en-
thusiasm for wellness programs with incentives for participation). This article 
by Mariner ultimately presents a thesis very similar to this Note: that health 
insurance is not a good vehicle for health status stratification. Id. at 330. This 
Note makes a novel contribution by providing a more detailed and technical 
look at wellness programs that discriminate based upon health status factors 
using financial incentives while Mariner’s article mainly approaches the prob-
lem from higher level insurance theory.  
 14. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (Supp. 2012).  
 15. See infra notes 73–74, 89 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See Madison et al., supra note 5, at 451. 
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grams, rather than granting all employers general permission 
(and even encouragement) to proceed.  
I.  THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF WELLNESS 
PROGRAMS   
It is important to understand some basic principles of 
health insurance before exploring the problematic nature of 
employer wellness programs with financial incentives for 
health status attainment. After establishing this foundational 
background, this section explains Congress’s purpose for enact-
ing both the ACA and the provision governing wellness pro-
grams. This section next contrasts this purpose with that of the 
original wellness program regulation under HIPAA. Finally, 
this section examines in greater detail the history and evolu-
tion of wellness program legislation.  
A. A HEALTH INSURANCE PRIMER  
Some basic background information about how health in-
surance works is helpful to understanding wellness programs’ 
role in the insurance system and how the programs’ financial 
incentives can adversely affect the group health insurance 
market. Financial incentives are created by discounting the 
price of insurance using differential premiums, copayments, 
and deductibles.18 A premium is the amount a purchaser pays 
for an insurer to assume the risk of the purchaser’s health care 
expenses19 while a copayment is a fixed amount a policyholder 
must pay at the time he or she receives certain health care ser-
vices.20 A deductible is the total amount that a policyholder 
must pay out-of-pocket before an insurance plan will begin cov-
ering services.21
 
 18. Janet L. Doglin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Weighing Status: Obesity, 
Class and Health Reform, 89 OR. L. REV. 1113, 1133 (2011).  
 While premiums, deductibles, and copayments 
are standard elements of most insurance plans, state and fed-
 19. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 5 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 69:1 (2012).  
 20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (9th ed. 2009). 
 21. Id. at 475. 
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eral laws22 require plans to completely cover certain preventive 
services without copayments or deductibles.23
Private health insurance can be offered either as part of an 
individual or group plan.
  
24 Most Americans are covered by 
group insurance.25 Group plans are generally provided by an 
employer.26 Individual plans are sold to people who do not have 
employer insurance either because they are self-employed, un-
employed, or because their employer does not provide health 
insurance benefits.27 Group plans pool risk among all mem-
bers—everyone in the group pays the same monthly insurance 
premium calculated using an estimation of the average cost of 
everyone in the group.28 Individual plans have traditionally 
been priced using underwriting.29 Underwriting practices base 
cost upon the estimated risk of the purchaser.30
 
 22. The law governing insurance plans depends upon a plan’s structure. 
The ACA wellness program provisions are applicable to all types of health in-
surance. See Lucinda Jesson, Weighing the Wellness Programs: The Legal Im-
plications of Imposing Personal Responsibility Obligations, 15 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & LAW 217, 241–42, 245–46 (2008), for a concise explanation about 
when insurance plans are subject to state versus federal law.  
 This allows in-
surers to “issue, decline, or differentially price insurance based 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(1) (Supp. 2012) (listing the mandatory covered 
services to include “A” or “B” rated services as designated by the United States 
Preventive Services Task Force, certain immunizations, certain preventative 
services for infants and children, and certain women’s preventative services); 
CCH, 2010 TAX LEGISLATION: PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE, 
HEALTH CARE RECONCILIATION, HIRE, AND OTHER RECENT TAX ACTS ¶ 530 
(CCH Editorial Staff eds., 2010); Jesson, supra note 22, at 241–42 (describing 
common state coverage requirements). Two examples of preventive services 
include screening for abdominal aortic aneurisms in smokers, and screening 
and counseling for childhood obesity. U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVICES TASK 
FORCE A & B RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.uspreventiveservicestask 
force.org/uspstf/uspsabrecs.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (listing mandatory 
coverage services). 
 24. Anne Maltz, Health Insurance 101, in INSURANCE LAW 2007: UNDER-
STANDING THE ABC’S 263, 272 (PLI Litig. and Admin. Practice, Course Hand-
book Ser. No. 11214, 2007). 
 25. See Mark V. Pauly & Bradley Herring, Risk Pooling and Regulation: 
Policy and Reality in Today’s Individual Health Insurance Market, 26 HEALTH 
AFF. 770, 770 (2007). 
 26. See id. at 771.  
 27. See id. at 771–72. 
 28. Amy B. Monahan, Health Insurance Risk Pooling and Social Solidari-
ty: A Response to Professor David Hyman, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 325, 326 (2008). 
 29. Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptu-
al Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1873, 1885 (2011).  
 30. Id. 
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on an individual’s prior health experience or expected risk.”31 
Group plans pool risk more effectively than individual plans.32 
Large groups distribute risk better than small groups because 
the risk is spread among more individuals.33 A final unique 
characteristic of group, as opposed to individual, health insur-
ance is that group health insurance receives a significant fed-
eral tax subsidy.34 In 2007, the Joint Committee on Taxation 
estimated there was more than $245 billion in tax expenditures 
associated with the current health insurance tax scheme.35
The ACA makes significant changes to the structure of the 
American health insurance system. After 2014, in order to 
avoid a fine, all Americans above a threshold income level must 
obtain insurance coverage, and all businesses with a certain 
number of employees must provide coverage for their workers.
  
36 
The Act also creates state insurance exchanges.37 These ex-
changes increase the opportunity for competitive pricing, in-
formed insurance policy selection, centralized administration, 
and uniform regulation for individual insurance.38 The pur-
chase mandate combined with state health insurance exchang-
es better aggregates the cumulative risk of people seeking indi-
vidual policies;39
 
 31. Id. 
 the exchanges create risk pools more akin to 
group insurance risk-sharing and also control administrative 
 32. Id. at 1884–85.  
 33. See id.  
 34. See Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Susannah Camic, Tax Credits for Health 
Insurance, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 73, 74–75 (2009), for a summary of the em-
ployer health insurance tax subsidy.  
 35. Id. at 75.  
 36. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. 2012) (mandating individual coverage); 26 
U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (Supp. 2011) (requiring large employers to offer minimal 
health care coverage). See generally CCH, supra note 23, at ¶¶ 405, 415, 425 
(summarizing and explaining the ACA coverage requirements). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(b) (Supp. 2012).  
 38. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH RE-
FORM, EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: WHAT ARE HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXCHANGES? 1 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/ 
7908.pdf.  
 39. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(J) (Supp. 2012) (“By significantly increasing 
health insurance coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which will in-
crease economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other provisions 
of this Act, will significantly reduce administrative costs and lower health in-
surance premiums.”); Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Indi-
vidual Health Insurance Market and Prospects for Change, 23 HEALTH AFF. 
79, 88 (2004).  
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costs.40 The Act also contains medical loss ratio requirements 
that strictly limit the proportion of insurer costs that may be 
used to contribute to overhead and other administrative ex-
penses.41 One purpose of these changes is to restructure the in-
dividual health insurance market to more closely resemble the 
large group market, both in terms of the amount of risk-sharing 
happening, and the tight control of underwriting and under-
writing-like practices.42
B. WELLNESS PROGRAMS AFTER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
  
It is difficult to directly ascertain Congress’s intent in pass-
ing the ACA because of the Act’s meager legislative record.43 
The partisan discourse that makes up the record reflects the 
fact that the ACA was passed through both congressional hous-
es in a sharply divided political environment—leaders agreed 
that the health system needed reform, but disagreed when it 
came to how best to effectuate change.44
 
 40. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(J) (“Administrative costs . . . are 26 to 30 per-
cent of premiums in the current individual and small group markets.”); M. 
Pauly et al., Individual Versus Job-Based Health Insurance: Weighing the Pros 
and Cons, 18 HEALTH AFF. 28, 32–33 (1999) (“The administrative expense . . . 
of nongroup insurance [is] often said to be high—as much as half of premiums 
. . . —while that of group insurance can fall to about 5 percent in very large 
groups.”).  
 An inquiry beyond the 
 41. In large group plans 85% of the premium cost must be allocated to 
health service delivery, while in small group plans and the individual market, 
80% of the premium costs must be so allocated. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(a) 
(Supp. 2012).  
 42. See Hoffman, supra note 29, at 1887.  
 43. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Crossing the Rubicon: The Impact of the 
Affordable Care Act on the Content of Insurance Coverage for Persons with 
Disabilities, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 554 (2011) (“For a 
law whose provisions are highly complex and whose enactment was undoubt-
edly one of the hardest fought in U.S. history, the [ACA] is remarkably short 
on legislative history.”).  
 44. 156 CONG. REC. E508 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Jeb 
Hensarling) (“Republicans agree that we must reform health care in America. 
The current system is unsustainable, and simply doing nothing is not an op-
tion.”); 156 CONG. REC. H2430 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Mike Pence) (“Reject this attempt to fix a government takeover of health care. 
Work with us to repeal and start over on health care reform that reflects the 
common sense and the common values of the American people.”); 156 CONG. 
REC. H2432 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Jim Langevin) (“This 
Congress is being given a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to fix a broken health 
care system that has left millions of families without the coverage and care 
they deserve.”); 156 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of 
Rep. Silvestre Reyes) (“I heard from many El Pasoans who shared their strug-
gles under the current broken health insurance system.”); 156 CONG. REC. 
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sparse official record shows that the Act was designed to both 
slow health care spending and increase Americans’ healthy 
years of life through regulation, preventative care, and health 
promotion activities.45 One of the ACA’s central objectives is to 
make health care more affordable and accessible to all Ameri-
cans.46 Implicit in this objective is the significance of the ACA’s 
commitment to individuals in poor health—the group facing the 
most adversity in the traditional health care system.47
The remainder of this section describes the current law 
governing wellness programs, explains the history of wellness 
plan regulation, and concludes with demographic data suggest-
ing wellness programs have the potential to significantly alter 
the health insurance landscape after the ACA.  
 
1. The Present State of the Law 
Wellness programs were first introduced as an exception 
carved out of the antidiscrimination provisions in the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).48 Well-
ness programs were described in detail in the HIPAA regula-
tions.49 Most recently, the programs were codified in the ACA 
with few, yet significant, changes.50 The ACA defines a wellness 
program as “a program offered by an employer that is designed 
to promote health or prevent disease that meets the applicable 
requirements of this subsection.”51
 
H2436 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Brian Bilbray) (“It is no se-
cret that the health care system is in need of reform . . . . While we can argue 
over many points, there is one issue where there is no debate: we need health 
care reform.”); CCH, supra note 
 The ACA recognizes two 
types of wellness programs: those that condition rewards on 
23, at 1–2.  
 45. See generally Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, PPACA and Public Health: 
Creating a Framework to Focus on Prevention and Wellness and Improve the 
Public’s Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366 (2011) (describing the extent of 
congressional consideration of public health issues and Congress’s understand-
ing of the critical importance of health care reform). 
 46. Id. at 373. 
 47. Cf. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 570 (6th Cir. 
2011) (“When healthy individuals opt not to buy health insurance, the pool of 
insured persons is smaller and less healthy as a whole, thus raising premi-
ums.”); Hoffman, supra note 29, at 1914–22 (discussing “financial security” 
policies in the ACA).  
 48. The HIPAA anti-discrimination provision is explained infra in the text 
accompanying notes 73–74.  
 49. NANCY LEE JONES ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40661, WELLNESS 
PROGRAMS: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1–5 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 1–2. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(A) (Supp. 2012).  
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health status factors, and those that do not.52 There are few re-
strictions on programs that do not condition rewards on health 
status factors.53
A program offering a reward based upon a health status 
factor must meet five conditions: (1) the reward must not be 
more than 30% of the cost of coverage;
  
54 (2) the program must 
“be reasonably designed to promote health or prevent dis-
ease”;55 (3) eligible individuals must have the opportunity to 
qualify for the reward annually;56 (4) the reward must “be made 
available to all similarly situated individuals”;57 and (5) mate-
rials describing the terms of the program must disclose the 
availability of a “reasonable alternative standard” or possibility 
of waiver for those for whom it would be impossible or unsafe to 
achieve the given standard.58 These requirements are supposed 
to minimize discrimination against unhealthy individuals.59
The first condition limits the value of the reward that a 
wellness program may offer participants. Even beyond the 30% 
of premium cost maximum, the ACA allows the limit to be in-
creased to 50% of the cost of coverage with the approval of the 
Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the 
Treasury.
 A 
closer examination of the first, second, and fourth conditions is 
helpful to better understand how the statute operates. 
60
 
 52. See id. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(B)–(C). Examples of programs that do not condi-
tion rewards upon health status factors include a program that pays for a gym 
membership, a program that gives a reward for participation in diagnostic 
testing, or a program that covers the costs of participation in smoking cessa-
tion counseling. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(2)(A)–(B), (D).  
 Employers may elect to offer this premium differen-
tial either as a penalty for people failing to meet a wellness ob-
 53. See id. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(B) (describing the only restriction as the re-
quirement that a program must be “made available to all similarly situated 
individuals”). 
 54. “Cost of coverage” is equal to the total of both employer and employee 
contributions to the insurance plan. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A).  
 55. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (“A program complies with [this provision] if [it] 
has a reasonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease in, 
participating individuals and it is not overly burdensome, is not a subterfuge 
for discriminating based on a health status factor, and is not highly suspect in 
the manner chosen to promote health or prevent disease.”).  
 56. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(C).  
 57. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D). 
 58. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(E). 
 59. See Jesson, supra note 22, at 248.  
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A). 
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jective or as a discount to people who do.61 However the differ-
ential is formulated, the effect is the same: individuals who are 
unable to achieve the standards will pay more for health insur-
ance.62 In some instances, wellness savings may be significant 
enough to completely cover the cost of the employee’s premi-
um.63
The second condition provides some assurance that the 
program will be designed in a way that actually improves par-
ticipants’ health. The statute itself states that this condition 
ought to be interpreted liberally: the standard is whether “the 
program has a reasonable chance” of improving health or pre-
venting disease.
 
64 The same subsection requires that the pro-
gram cannot be “overly burdensome,” a “subterfuge for discrim-
inating based on a health status factor” or “highly suspect” in 
the method chosen to achieve its goal.65
The fourth condition requires that the reward be made 
available to “all similarly situated individuals.” To satisfy this 
condition, the program must provide a “reasonable alternative 
standard,” or waiver of the standard, for individuals for whom 
achieving the standard is either “unreasonably difficult due to 
a medical condition” or “medically inadvisable.”
 
66 The veracity 
of this information may be verified from the participant’s phy-
sician,67 a caveat that significantly curtails the routine use of 
this exception to casually circumvent cost differentials.68
In November 2012, the Secretaries of the Department of 
the Treasury, Department of Labor, and the Department of 
Health and Human Services issued a proposed regulation gov-
erning wellness programs.
  
69
 
 61. See Madison et al., supra note 
 The proposed regulations state 
that the maximum differential will be maintained at the statu-
5, at 459–60 (“[I]t is not clear that all 
carrots are created equally, as they can often be reframed easily as sticks. . . . 
[T]he effect of a penalty incentive program may be to transform a wage differ-
ential into an insurance premium differential.”).  
 62. Id. 
 63. Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1603 (2011).  
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B). 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(i)(I)–(II). 
 67. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(ii).  
 68. See Mariner, supra note 13, at 285 (noting that a plan may require a 
physician’s recommendation for qualification).  
 69. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health 
Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,620 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146–47).  
  
1484 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1474 
 
tory minimum of 30% of the cost of coverage except in the case 
of smoking.70 The premium differential for smokers is greater, 
up to 50% of the total cost of coverage.71 Further, the proposed 
regulations provide detail about what will and will not be con-
sidered a reasonable alternative standard for people under the 
condition requiring that rewards be made available to “all simi-
larly situated individuals.”72
2. The Evolution of Wellness Program Regulation and 
Litigation  
  
The regulation of wellness programs was born from an ex-
ception to HIPAA group insurance antidiscrimination require-
ments. HIPAA contains a general prohibition forbidding all 
group insurance plans or issuers from discriminating against 
policyholders based upon health status.73 This general rule is 
subject to an important exception: wellness programs that meet 
the requirements set forth in the HIPAA regulations, and now 
the ACA, do not have to comply with the antidiscrimination 
provisions.74
HIPAA was passed in 1996.
  
75 It was not until 2006, howev-
er, that the regulations promulgating wellness programs were 
released.76 In 2007, two bills with provisions highly supportive 
of wellness programs and similar initiatives were considered, 
though neither was enacted.77
 
 70. Id. at 70,623–24. 
 In 2010, the ACA codified the 
HIPAA regulations with two important differences: (1) the ACA 
raised the reward maximum from 20% to 30% of the total cost 
of the premium and added administrative flexibility by allow-
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 70,624–25.  
 73. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(b)(1)(i) (2012); see also Nondiscrimination and 
Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 
75,014, 75,017 (Dec. 13, 2006) (“The HIPAA nondiscrimination provisions gen-
erally prohibit a plan or issuer from charging similarly situated individuals 
different premiums or contributions based on a health factor.”). 
 74. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f); see also 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,017 (“The HIPAA 
nondiscrimination provisions do not prevent a plan or issuer from establishing 
discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise applicable copayments or deducti-
bles in return for adherence to [wellness programs].”). 
 75. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 76. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702.  
 77. See Majette, supra note 45, at 368. These bills were the Healthy Life-
styles and Prevention America Act, S. 1342, 110th Cong. (2007), and the 
Healthy Workforce Act of 2007, S. 1753, 110th Cong. (2007). Id. at 368 nn.20–
21.  
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ing the Secretaries to increase this limit to 50%;78 and (2) the 
ACA provided for a ten-state demonstration project extending 
the wellness program provisions to individual insurance 
plans.79 The ACA also provides grants to small employers with-
out wellness programs to implement “comprehensive workplace 
wellness programs” consistent with criteria to be delineated by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.80
HIPAA legislative and administrative records elucidate the 
underlying purpose of a wellness program exception. The 
HIPAA Senate Report says of the programs,  
  
Because of the difficulty of constructing language which allows such 
beneficial practices to continue, while prohibiting plan designs and 
practices that are intended to discriminate based on health status or 
other related factors . . . the legislation expressly allows employee 
health benefit plans and health plan issuers . . . to modify premiums, 
copayments, and deductibles in return for adherence to [wellness pro-
grams].81
The background information introducing the final 2006 HIPAA 
regulations provides additional information about the rationale 
behind the reward limit, explaining that the purpose of the cap 
is “to avoid a reward or penalty being so large as to have the ef-
fect of denying coverage or creating too heavy a financial penal-
ty.”
 
82 The regulations’ background also observes that “[t]he 20 
percent limit on the size of the reward in the final regulations 
allows plans and issuers to maintain flexibility in their ability 
to design wellness programs, while avoiding rewards or penal-
ties so large as to deny coverage or create too heavy a financial 
penalty . . . .”83 Initially, proposed regulations suggested lower 
percentage choices of 10% and 15%, but after rulemaking com-
ments submitted by employers and the insurance industry the 
final limit was fixed at 20%.84 In 2006, premium discounts at 
the 20% level potentially generated an average payment differ-
ence of $920 per participant per year.85
 
 78. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (Supp. 2012) (30% maximum), 
with 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(2)(i) (20% maximum).  
 The 2006 Regulations 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(l).  
 80. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 10408(c), 124 Stat. 119, 977 (2010).  
 81. S. REP. NO. 104-156, at 19 (1995).  
 82. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the 
Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,018 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 75,021. 
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emphasize that the “reasonable design” requirement86 should 
be liberally construed, and that there is no need for “a scientific 
record that the method promotes wellness to satisfy this stand-
ard.”87 Ultimately, wellness programs are regulated to ensure 
“fewer instances in which [they] shift costs to high-risk individ-
uals, and more instances in which these individuals succeed at 
improving health habits and health.”88
Wellness programs with financial incentives have the po-
tential to clash with anti-discrimination provisions in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Congress enacted the 
ADA to prevent discrimination against people living with a 
wide variety of disabilities.
 
89
A covered entity[
 The ADA states,  
90
] shall not require a medical examination and shall 
not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an 
individual with a disability or as to the nature of the severity of the 
disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-
related and consistent with business necessity.91
The ADA does not explicitly mention wellness programs,
 
92 but 
the programs are addressed in the ADA’s legislative history. 
The House Report explains that in order to be ADA-compliant, 
wellness programs monitoring health status factors such as 
weight and cholesterol must be voluntary, confidential, and 
may not limit insurance eligibility or prevent professional ad-
vancement.93
 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (Supp. 2012). 
 While the legitimacy and scope of wellness pro-
 87. 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.  
 88. Id. at 75,020.  
 89. See JONES ET AL., supra note 49, at 6–7; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-
485, pt. 2, at 22–23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (“The pur-
pose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to 
end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons 
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life; to 
provide enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities, and to ensure that the Federal government plays a central 
role in enforcing these standards on behalf of individuals with disabilities. The 
ADA defines ‘disability’ to mean, with respect to an individual: a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life ac-
tivities of such individual, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded 
as having such an impairment.”).  
 90. A covered entity is defined as a “health plan,” a “health care clearing-
house,” and “[a] health care provider who transmits any health information in 
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter.” 
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011).  
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006).  
 92. Id.  
 93. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
303, 357.  
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grams have yet to undergo extensive judicial examination, the 
first such case to be heard in federal court involved an allega-
tion of an ADA violation.  
The first, and presently only, case to grapple with the 
ACA’s wellness provisions is Seff v. Broward County.94 Seff was 
a class action lawsuit initiated by past and present employees 
of Broward County contesting the legality of a $20 penalty for 
non-participation in an employee wellness program.95 The 
plaintiff contested the program’s use of a medical examination 
and questionnaire.96 The plaintiffs claimed that the penalty vio-
lated the ADA by effectively making the examination and ques-
tionnaire compulsory.97 The court acknowledged that the ADA 
creates a safe harbor for wellness programs that meet two re-
quirements: (1) the program must either be a term in a bona 
fide benefit plan or a plan itself;98 and (2) the program must be 
“based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administer-
ing such risks.”99
The Seff court found the program met both safe harbor re-
quirements. The court held that the wellness program was 
clearly a term in a benefit plan, and may even be considered a 
benefit plan unto itself because of the disease coaching and 
medication cost waiver benefits for participants.
  
100 The court al-
so held that the program was based on “accepted principles of 
risk assessment” both because it collected aggregated data for 
analysis using risk classification techniques to develop future 
benefit plans, and because it was designed to control risk by 
making the insured population healthier, and therefore less ex-
pensive to cover.101
 
 94. 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011).  
 Seff suggests that courts may be friendly to 
wellness programs, at least in the context of the ADA. Wellness 
program litigation, however, has yet to be developed and it is 
too early to determine how these programs will fare in the 
courts.  
 95. Id. at 1371.  
 96. Id. at 1371–72.  
 97. Id. at 1372.  
 98. Id. at 1373–74; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. 2011). 
 99. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–74; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). 
 100. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373 n.5.  
 101. Id. at 1374. 
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3. Trends in Population Health and Wellness Program 
Prevalence 
In 2005, over 130 million Americans were afflicted with a 
chronic condition, and by 2020, this number is expected to in-
crease to 157 million.102 Spending on chronic illness is estimat-
ed to increase by 42% between 2003 and 2023.103 The burden of 
illness is not evenly distributed across the population: multiple 
health determinants—including an aging population and work-
force, an increasingly obese population,104 wealth, and race—
affect who is most likely to experience poor health.105 Health de-
terminants significantly affect health disparities: over 30% of 
adults living below the federal poverty level suffer from activity 
limitations related to chronic illness, while only 10% of adults 
over 400% of the federal poverty level are so afflicted.106 Moreo-
ver, people with poor health statuses—who tend also to be 
poorer financially—already pay more for health care in both 
raw dollars, and percentage of income, contributed to health 
care expenditures through deductible and copayment costs.107
Considering the deteriorating health of Americans and the 
rising cost of care, it is unsurprising that employers are em-
bracing wellness program to control costs and increase worker 
productivity. Between 2004 and 2006, the number of large em-
ployers
  
108 offering employee incentives for healthy behaviors in-
creased from 7% to 19%, and between 2006 and 2007 the num-
ber of large employers offering premium differentials as a 
wellness reward increased.109
 
 102. Bodenheimer et al., supra note 
 In 2007, almost 40% of employers 
without wellness programs reported an intention to pay em-
12, at 64.  
 103. Id. at 65.  
 104. Id. at 65.  
 105. See, e.g., Nancy E. Adler & Katherine Newman, Socioeconomic Dispar-
ities in Health: Pathways and Policies, 21 HEALTH AFF. 60, 60–61, 70 n.60 
(2002).  
 106. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO 
HEALTH 21 (2008), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/ 
reports/2008/rwjf22441.  
 107. Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination 
Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1159, 1166–70 (2012).  
 108. A “large employer” is defined as an employer with at least 500 em-
ployees. Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and 
Lifestyle Discrimination—The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 192 
(2008).  
 109. Id.  
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ployees for biometric wellness achievements within the next 
three years.110
The changes the ACA makes to the American insurance 
system, the increasing prevalence of chronic illness, and the 
rising popularity of wellness programs together suggest that 
wellness programs will have a significant role in the future of 
American health insurance and health care.
 
111
II.  THE PROBLEM WITH FINANCIALLY INCENTED 
WELLNESS PROGRAMS   
 The current pro-
gram structure, however, is self-contradictory and risks exacer-
bating health disparities rather than improving the health of 
the population.  
This section examines how the current wellness program 
regulations create technical and ideological issues with other 
regulatory schemes. It first considers how the wellness provi-
sions may conflict with existing law and then examines how the 
provisions operate in relation to the ACA.  
A. LEGAL ISSUES 
Wellness programs with aggressive financial incentives 
implicate statutes that protect certain types of people and in-
formation, like the ADA.112
1. Wellness Programs and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
 Additionally, these programs con-
flict with the original purpose envisioned for them by HIPAA, 
and with the overarching goals of the ACA itself.  
The discriminatory nature of premium differentials based 
on health status potentially clashes with the ADA. The ADA’s 
legislative history and the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) guidance both require that 
 
 110. Madison et al., supra note 5, at 451 (citing NAT’L BUS. GRP. ON 
HEALTH & TOWERS WATSON, THE ROAD AHEAD: SHAPING HEALTH CARE 
STRATEGY IN A POST-REFORM ENVIRONMENT 15 (2011), available at http:// 
www.thehortongroup.com/Files/41c8e753-70d4-b602-38db 
-15481ad7e12d.pdf). 
 111. See Michelle M. Smith, Making Wellness Programs Work Well, OCCU-
PATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY (June 2011), http://ohsonline.com/Articles/2011/ 
06/01/Making-Wellness-Programs-Work-Well.aspx.  
 112. While there has been little litigation about these potential issues to 
date, this may change in light of the ACA’s push for more wellness programs 
with greater financial differentials. 
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wellness programs be voluntary.113 The EEOC guidance says a 
program is voluntary “as long as an employer neither requires 
participation nor penalizes employees who do not partici-
pate.”114 Wellness programs with aggressive financial incentives 
push the boundary between voluntary and coercive. The per-
missible financial differentials are not minimal and have sub-
stantially increased after the ACA.115
While the issue has yet to be extensively litigated,
 It is not difficult to imag-
ine that a court could find that a wellness program with 
significant financial incentives, although ostensibly voluntary, 
in reality functions as a mandatory wellness program, and 
thereby runs afoul of the ADA.  
116 as the 
incentive differential is permitted to increase, so does the like-
lihood that a court would strike down a program as incompati-
ble with the ADA.117 It is difficult to characterize a program as 
voluntary when there is a significant financial incentive for 
participation.118 The EEOC once promulgated guidance suggest-
ing that a wellness program would be considered voluntary if 
the inducement did not exceed the 20% limit in HIPAA.119 This 
limit was subsequently withdrawn and replaced with the lan-
guage, “The Commission is continuing to examine what level, if 
any, of financial inducement to participate in a wellness pro-
gram would be permissible under the ADA.”120
 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 75 (1990) reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357; EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915-002, EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMI-
NATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
(2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.  
 This shift from a 
concrete number to a highly subjective standard suggests that 
potentially any financial inducement could be considered a vio-
lation of the ADA voluntariness requirement.  
 114. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 113. 
 115. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 116. But see Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 
2011) (holding that the county did not violate the ADA by requiring employee 
medical examinations and asking health related questions of employees as a 
condition of a wellness program).  
 117. Mello & Rosenthal, supra note 108, at 195; cf. Madison et al., supra 
note 5, at 460 n.75 (“The implication is that the EEOC views the provision of 
benefits as an appropriate baseline, such that a threat to deprive someone of 
these benefits if they refuse to complete a[] [health risk assessment] has the 
potential to be coercive, rendering the medical history ‘involuntary.’”).  
 118. Madison et al., supra note 5, at 460 n.75. 
 119. JONES ET AL., supra note 49, at 8. 
 120. Id. 
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Opportunities to contest the voluntariness of wellness pro-
gram participation, and thus challenge program ADA compli-
ance, will increase if Congress or the Secretaries increase the 
financial incentives to approach the maximum differential.121 
Exactly where a court, an administrative body, or Congress will 
draw this line remains to be seen.122 Nonetheless, it is undenia-
ble that there is a significant difference between the old 20% 
limit under HIPAA, and the 30% (and potentially 50%) limit in 
the ACA. While the EEOC no longer sets a hard limit, the 
Commission’s continued scrutiny suggests that it considers 
these programs to be a very real threat to ADA compliance.123
2. Seff v. Broward County and the Dawn of Wellness Program 
Litigation 
  
Seff suggests that many employee wellness programs fit 
nicely within the ADA’s safe harbor and are generally con-
sistent with the goals of the ADA.124 Indeed, most wellness pro-
grams are both part of a comprehensive benefits program and 
are as intuitively beneficial to participants’ health. Additional-
ly, most wellness programs use established principles of risk 
assessment as described in Seff125: they seek to control risk and 
cost by making the population healthier.126 One interpretation 
of this is that the ADA will not be a major sticking point in de-
termining the legality of wellness programs with financial in-
centives.127
The only factors the Seff court considered when evaluating 
ADA compliance were: (1) whether the wellness program was a 
term in a benefit program; and (2) whether it was based on ac-
 But it is also possible that courts will develop a 
more nuanced approach to evaluating the interplay between 
the ADA and wellness programs as the number of judicial opin-
ions on point grows.  
 
 121. See Mello & Rosenthal, supra note 108, at 195.  
 122. See id. at 197–98.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 125. Id. at 1374. 
 126. See Mello & Rosenthal, supra note 108, at 192 (noting that a vast ma-
jority of employers believe they could reduce their healthcare costs by “influ-
encing their employees to adopt a healthier lifestyle”). 
 127. The ADA’s ability to stymie the scope of wellness programs has yet to 
be determined: the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has not 
taken an official position regarding how the ADA affects wellness programs. 
ADA & Gina: Incentives for Workplace Wellness Programs, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (June 24, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/ 
2011/ada_gina_incentives.html.  
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cepted risk principles.128 This analysis forgoes any considera-
tion of voluntariness, whether actual or constructive. The court 
observed that “in this case, the program was more benign as 
the employee only faced a $20.00 sanction for non-participation, 
as opposed to being ineligible for coverage.”129 Perhaps because 
of the relatively small $20 penalty for non-participation the 
court in Seff assumed voluntariness without explicitly address-
ing it. The wellness program at issue in Seff is further distin-
guishable from more aggressive programs in that it applied a 
nominal penalty for non-participants, rather than conditioning 
a price differential upon the achievement of an outcome.130
B. THE ACA AND HIPAA: DIVERGING APPROACHES 
 
While the holding in Seff tentatively bodes well for the legiti-
macy of wellness programs under the ADA, the case marks only 
the beginning of wellness program litigation. Much remains to 
be determined about how more aggressive financially incented 
wellness programs may be reconciled with the ADA voluntari-
ness requirement.  
By codifying the HIPAA regulations with a greater reward 
limit, the ACA takes a decidedly different approach to wellness 
programs. This subsection discusses two important ways well-
ness programs differ under HIPAA and the ACA. One differ-
ence is that by increasing an already generous award maxi-
mum, the ACA reflects comfort with increasing the financial 
incentive. The other difference lies in the Acts’ contrasting 
tones.  
While at first glance the difference between a 20% and a 
30% reward limit does not appear to be extraordinary, the 50% 
increase and the high cost of health insurance premiums make 
this price variation substantial.131 For example, in 2009, the av-
erage premium for one-person employer-sponsored coverage 
was $4669.132
 
 128. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.  
 Twenty percent of $4669 is $933.80. Thirty per-
cent of $4669 is $1400.70; a 30% limit therefore deprives a ben-
 129. Id. at 1374.  
 130. See id. at 1371–72. 
 131. See Baker, supra note 63, at 1603 (“[I]n some cases the rebate could 
easily exceed the employee’s share of the premium.”).  
 132. BETH LEVIN CRIMMEL, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND 
QUALITY, MED. EXPEND. PANEL SURVEY, STATISTICAL BRIEF #285, EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED SINGLE, EMPLOYEE-PLUS-ONE, AND FAMILY HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE SELECTION AND COST, 2009, at 1 (2009), available at http://meps 
.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st285/stat285.pdf. 
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efit recipient of an additional $466 dollars. While the proposed 
regulations limit the 50% differential to smokers133—which is 
unsurprising both because smoking might be considered more a 
behavior than a health status factor and because underwriting 
for smoking has been imagined elsewhere in the ACA134—these 
regulations are only proposed and even if adopted may be 
amended by the Secretaries. If the Secretaries should permit 
the maximum 50% limit, a $2334 differential would be permis-
sible in the example above. This is $1401 more than would 
have been permitted under HIPAA’s 20% limit. Exacerbating 
this result is the fact that premium prices have escalated since 
2009.135
A differential of $933 is far from inconsequential. Even as-
suming an annual $933 increase is a benign or justifiable dif-
ferential for individuals failing to achieve certain health status 
indicators, the difference between $933, $1400, and $2334 re-
spectively is significant. And escalating premium prices magni-
fy these sizable percentage-based rewards.  
 The cost differential today is even greater.  
While the programs may be framed to present these dollar 
differentials as fair when the money is provided as an extra—a 
bonus payment for obtaining target health status factors136—
widespread adoption of large financial “rewards” would ulti-
mately only serve to increase the amount people with poor 
health statuses pay in relation to people with good health sta-
tuses.137
 
 133. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health 
Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,620, 70,623 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146–47).  
 It is hard to imagine such a differential as a benign 
bonus. 
 134. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 4004(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 545 (2010) (providing for public media cam-
paigns to address smoking cessation); id. § 4201(c)(2)(B)(iii), 124 Stat. 565 
(creating grants for community smoking cessation programs). 
 135. See Nat’l Bus. Grp. on Health, Majority of Large Employers Revamp-
ing Health Benefit Programs for 2012, National Business Group on Health 
Survey Finds, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/ 
news-releases/majority-of-large-employers-revamping-health-benefit 
-programs-for-2012-national-business-group-on-health-survey-finds 
-128003893.html (“[E]mployers estimate their health care benefit costs will 
increase an average of 7.2 % in 2012.”). 
 136. See Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One 
Easy Lesson, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652, 657 (2008) (“Some plans waive cost-
sharing requirements or give ‘bonuses’ to members who successfully meet 
health ‘goals,’ where the goals are risk factors in disguise . . . .”).  
 137. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
2209, 2247 (2011).  
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Even accounting for any decrease in health care costs re-
sulting from healthier outcomes due to program incentives, it 
would be very expensive for insurers to pay thousands in “bo-
nus” dollars without affecting premiums. Though insurers may 
try to control costs by providing smaller awards, they may find 
it more attractive to simply increase the entire group’s premi-
um in an amount commensurate with the reward—all individ-
uals in the group would still pay the same premium, but at an 
inflated price.138 A policyholder could only decrease his or her 
health insurance cost to a level at, or below, the actual group 
risk-rated price by demonstrating healthy health status fac-
tors.139 A cost-conscious insurance plan would likely opt for this 
latter scenario where it can both cut costs and reap the benefits 
of a healthier risk pool. Once the dollars at stake become signif-
icant—arguably, at the 20% level, as they already are—there is 
no appreciable difference between financial incentives termed 
“bonuses” versus “penalties.”140
Other differences between HIPAA and the ACA create 
helpful contextual clues useful for understanding how the ACA 
paints wellness programs in a different light than HIPAA. First 
and foremost, HIPAA sought to eliminate health status dis-
crimination from group health plans.
  
141 The exception in 
HIPAA carved wellness programs out of a general ban on 
health status discrimination; this exception, however, is strictly 
controlled through the wellness provision regulations.142
 
 138. See Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility 
in Health Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 221 (2008); Monahan, supra note 
 Abuse 
28, 
at 325 (“[I]nstead of pooling our collective health risks we are creating ways in 
which individuals with low health risks can opt out of the risk pool or other-
wise receive preferential treatment.”).  
 139. While this design may cause insurers to risk running afoul of their 
mandatory medical loss ratio, it is nonetheless conceivable that they could 
strike a balance that results in a premium price that is elevated solely for the 
reason that discounts are available to people participating in wellness pro-
grams and achieving desirable health status factors.  
 140. See Mariner, supra note 138, at 221 (“The distinction between rewards 
and penalties, however, is often in the eye of the beholder.”).  
 141. S. REP. NO. 104-156, at 36 (1996) (“Section 101(a)(1)(A) requires 
health plan issuers to offer whole group coverage to any group purchaser de-
siring to purchase coverage. Section 101(a)(1)(B) prohibits employee health 
benefit plans and health plan issuers offering group health plans from estab-
lishing eligibility, continuation of eligibility, enrollment, or premium contribu-
tion requirements based on health status, medical conditions, claims experi-
ence, receipt of health care, medical history, evidence of insurability, or 
disability.”).  
 142. See supra notes 48–59 and accompanying text.  
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of financially incented wellness initiatives is prevented by lim-
iting the award for wellness program participation to 20% of an 
individual’s premium cost,143 along with the other four statuto-
ry requirements.144 Twenty percent was the highest of the pro-
posed percentages under HIPAA145: this limit was intended to 
avoid unduly penalizing people who did not participate or failed 
to meet a health status standard.146
These regulatory provisions are supposed to mitigate the 
burden of any differential imposed because of an individual’s 
failure to achieve a health status factor.
  
147 This protective func-
tion stands in stark contrast to the ACA’s “focus on prevention 
and wellness.”148 The ACA expressly seeks to expand the role of 
wellness provisions.149 It encourages employers to add programs 
and to experiment with program design to maximize the incen-
tives for health.150
C. RECONCILING WELLNESS PROGRAMS WITH THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT  
 And so while HIPAA used the wellness pro-
gram regulations to reign in potentially harmful discriminatory 
practices, the ACA changes tack, embracing wellness programs 
and holding them out as a source of innovation to promote 
healthier living and cost savings.  
In addition to creating conflict with existing statutes, well-
ness programs are situated at the juncture of several contradic-
tory policies driving the ACA. This section discusses whether 
 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (Supp. 2012). 
 144. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(C)–(E).  
 145. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the 
Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,018 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
 146. Id.  
 147. See Anita K. Chancey, Getting Healthy: Issues to Consider Before Im-
plementing a Wellness Program, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 85–87 (2009).  
 148. Peter D. Jacobson & Johanna R. Lauer, Health Reform 2010: Incre-
mental Advance or Radical Transformation?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1289 
(2011); see, e.g., Health System Reform: New Health Law Structured to Accel-
erate Expansion of Wellness, Prevention Programs, BNA: HEALTH INSURANCE 
REPORT (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.lockelord.com/art_bnahealthsystemreform 
_2010/ (“The recently enacted health care reform law has created unprece-
dented opportunities for expanding workplace programs for wellness, disease 
prevention, and chronic disease management . . . .” (quoting health care law 
attorney Denise Hanna); Majette, supra note 45, at 366 (referring to the ACA 
and “the infrastructure that Congress designed to focus on prevention and 
wellness.”)).  
 149. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (2012); Nondiscrimination and Wellness Pro-
grams in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.  
 150. See sources cited supra note 149. 
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wellness programs can accomplish their aim of promoting 
health and preventing disease in the context of the ACA. This 
inquiry is complicated by the fact that articulating the precise 
purpose of the ACA is difficult due to its diverse provisions and 
the complex health care landscape that the law transforms. 
This section presents two frameworks useful for considering 
health policy and analyzes wellness programs using these 
frameworks.  
1. Frameworks for Conceptualizing Wellness Programs  
Facially, wellness programs are an interesting experiment 
in cost control. Practically, however, their presence as an ex-
ception to the HIPAA antidiscrimination provisions meshes 
contradictory policies and creates suboptimal results. Two 
frameworks for considering health reform that are particularly 
useful for analyzing the contradictions of wellness programs in-
clude: (1) comparing social solidarity and personal responsibil-
ity ideologies;151 and (2) comparing the individualist paradigm 
and the public health paradigm.152
Social solidarity reflects “goals of mutual aid and sup-
port.”
 
153 A social solidarity approach to health insurance is 
characterized by a system where people of all health statuses 
pay the same for health care coverage.154 In many ways, group 
health insurance typifies social solidarity because all employees 
are offered coverage at the same premium price, even though 
certain individuals will predictably incur greater health care 
costs because of their health status, age, or other factor.155 Per-
sonal responsibility reflects that individuals carry different 
health risks and that individuals are not responsible for the 
risk of others.156 An example of personal responsibility is an in-
dividual health plan that prices or makes coverage determina-
tions according to the type and amount of risk posed by a par-
ticular individual.157
 
 151. See Mariner, supra note 
 
138, at 201–08.  
 152. See generally Micah L. Berman, A Public Health Perspective on Health 
Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 353, pt. 1 (2011) (arguing that the ACA re-
flects an “individualist/biomedical paradigm” of preventive health).  
 153. Mariner, supra note 138, at 205.  
 154. Id. at 206.  
 155. Id. at 207.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 207–08.  
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Wellness programs put these two approaches directly at 
odds. The group insurance setting embodies social solidarity 
because all individuals in the group pay the same premium. 
The group’s premium is set by the collective risk of the group, 
thereby assuring everyone coverage even though the premium 
is more expensive than if the group was composed of a very 
healthy risk pool. However, wellness programs create a price 
differential based on a group member’s individual health 
risk.158 Wellness programs may target factors like blood pres-
sure, weight, and cholesterol level—the very same factors that 
are used to set premium rates.159 This creates a scenario where 
“wellness programs reintroduce the very risk rating that 
[HIPAA] . . . initially forbade.”160 While this is tempered some-
what by the requirement that wellness programs incorporate 
alternatives for people unable to meet the standards,161 the 
wellness provisions act as a proxy for pricing by underwrit-
ing.162 The overall effect is to introduce stratification into the 
group market in a way that very much resembles the troubled 
individual market.163
The individualist paradigm and the public health para-
digm are useful for exploring another dimension of wellness 
programs. The individualist paradigm has a biomedical compo-
nent—the belief that medical research identifies the source and 
often the solution to health problems—and the idea that an in-
dividual is responsible for his or her own health.
  
164 The public 
health paradigm takes a “population-based perspective” to 
health and examines the social and environmental factors that 
cause variations in health status.165
Health promotion and improved health status outcomes 
are wellness program objectives consistent with the public 
health model in the abstract. But realistically, wellness pro-
grams are more a product of the individualist model.
  
166
 
 158. Id. at 217.  
 Well-
ness programs’ assumption that an individual’s level of motiva-
tion is the primary barrier to health and that this motivation 
 159. See id. at 222.  
 160. Id. 
 161. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(E) (Supp. 2012).  
 162. See Mariner, supra note 138, at 222.  
 163. Id. at 225–26.  
 164. Berman, supra note 152, at 356–57.  
 165. Id. at 360–61.  
 166. Cf. Berman, supra note 152, at 377 (explaining how the increase in 
reward limit threatens to worsen workplace inequities).  
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can be influenced by financial incentives considers almost none 
of the social and environmental factors that affect health sta-
tus.167 A narrow conception of health determinants disparately 
impacts sub-populations already bearing a disproportionate 
burden of illness and disease.168 Wellness programs, as present-
ly described in regulatory and statutory language,169 are not 
adequately designed to account for the complexities of health 
disparities, such as low socioeconomic status.170 When the most 
important determinants are excluded from the calculation, the 
result is to exacerbate disparities rather than improve 
health.171 Those individuals “most likely to be subject to well-
ness program requirements may be those who need insurance 
the most and can least afford higher costs.”172
2. Tension in the Statutory Language 
 This result is nei-
ther intended nor desirable.  
The language in the ACA’s wellness program provisions 
suggests that the aim of the provisions is muddled. If read lit-
erally, the statute actually forbids wellness programs from dis-
criminating based on health status.173 Any wellness plan that 
conditions rewards on a health status factor must be “reasona-
bly designed to promote health or prevent disease.”174 The stat-
ute next lists several tests that such a program must satisfy, 
including that the program not be “a subterfuge for discrimi-
nating based on a health status factor.”175
 
 167. See id. at 377–78; Mariner, supra note 
 Given that these 
wellness provisions exist as an exception to HIPAA’s prohibi-
tion against health status discrimination, it is facially anoma-
lous that they simultaneously forbid health status discrimina-
138, at 218–25.  
 168. See Berman, supra note 152, at 360–61. 
 169. HIPAA provides an example of a permissible wellness program that 
conditions rewards on health status factors. This program provides a 20% dis-
count to employees participating in a wellness program that consists of achiev-
ing less than 200 mg/dl on cholesterol test (and meets the other statutory re-
quirements for notice and reasonable alternatives). 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3) 
(2012).  
 170. See generally Berman, supra note 152 (discussing adequacy of well-
ness program design). 
 171. See id. at 376.  
 172. Mariner, supra note 138, at 225.  
 173. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(C), (3)(B) (Supp. 2012) (requiring well-
ness programs that discriminate “based on a health status factor” not be “a 
subterfuge for discriminating based on a health status factor”).  
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B). 
 175. Id. 
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tion. This textual inconsistency raises more than a minor tech-
nical issue, especially considering all of the legal and policy 
concerns raised by wellness programs that have already been 
discussed. The confusing language emphasizes that the aim of 
the statute is not as lucid as it might initially seem.176 The lan-
guage appears to give employer health insurance plans permis-
sion to develop wellness programs that charge differential pric-
es based on health status factors, while leaving open the 
possibility for disputes about the legality of such programs.177
D. ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Both incentivizing health and providing affordable insurance 
coverage for people in poor health are laudable goals, but the 
wellness provisions’ attempt to achieve both at once demon-
strates that it is tremendously difficult, if not impossible, for 
them to coexist in this statute.  
Two additional considerations raised by the current con-
ception of wellness programs are worthy of mention. First, 
there is a concern that employers will use the programs as an 
avenue for designing health insurance plans that preferentially 
select the healthy. Second, wellness programs implicate federal 
tax policy as it relates to the tax-exempt status of employee 
health benefits.  
When the ACA is fully implemented, employers may use 
wellness programs as a tool both to indirectly attract healthy 
employees into their workforce and to push unhealthy employ-
ees out of the employer plan and into the state health insur-
ance exchanges.178 One way to achieve this risk selection is for 
employers to provide wellness incentives at the maximum al-
lowable financial reward.179
 
 176. Cf. Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine 
Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 167 
(2011) (describing the prohibition of wellness programs that are a subterfuge 
for discrimination as ineffective and impractical). 
 When it comes to recruiting poten-
tial employees, an aggressive wellness program will tend to at-
 177. “Permission” because of the distinction between programs that dis-
criminate on a health status factor, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(B) and (C), as well 
as an example of a permissible wellness in HIPAA that conditions financial 
rewards on achieving a desirable cholesterol level. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3) 
ex. 3 (2012). A “possibility for disputes about the legality of such programs,” 
because the distinction between the aforementioned permissible program that 
discriminates based upon a health status factor and a program that does not 
discriminate is unclear from the language in both the ACA and HIPAA.  
 178. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 176, at 142–57.  
 179. See id. at 149. 
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tract the healthy and repel the unhealthy.180 Also, wellness 
programs’ financial incentives may be used to encourage em-
ployees in poor health to seek health insurance in the exchang-
es rather than through the employer.181
Wellness programs also generate a tax policy consideration 
arising from the substantial federal tax subsidy received by 
employer-sponsored health plans.
 This effect would be 
magnified as the differential awarded for a desirable health 
status increases. 
182 An essential function of 
employer-sponsored health insurance is to pool risk in a group, 
making health coverage accessible and affordable to everyone 
in the group, regardless of health status.183 While this tax sub-
sidy probably exists more for historic reasons than equitable 
ones,184 justification for its continued existence hinges at least 
in part on the added incentive for employers to offer health 
benefits.185 The employer group market is generally considered 
successful when compared to the individual market because it 
pools risk and then spreads it evenly.186 This risk-spreading is 
most beneficial to individuals likely to have poor health—for 
instance, persons of lower socioeconomic status.187 High income 
individuals, however, are more likely to have tax-exempt group 
insurance plans.188
 
 180. This is a type of “risk classification by design.” Risk classification by 
design refers to the calculated construction of health insurance policies engi-
neered to attract a healthier than average population. See Baker, supra note 
 When the group insurance market engages 
63, at 1589; see also Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 176, at 146–47.  
 181. Wellness programs are just one piece of a complicated incentive struc-
ture that an employer may create to encourage employees with poor health 
statuses to seek health insurance outside of the employer-sponsored program. 
Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 176, at 158–71.  
 182. Money paid towards employer sponsored health plans is exempt from 
income taxation. See Goldberg & Camic, supra note 34, at 174. 
 183. Baker, supra note 63, at 1595.  
 184. See William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and 
Cross-Subsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 279, 285 (2009) (describing the origin of employment-based health insur-
ance as “an historical accident”).  
 185. See Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, 
Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 55 (2010) (de-
scribing how tax law augments risk-pooling in group markets).  
 186. Hoffman, supra note 29, at 1884–85. 
 187. See Adler & Newman, supra note 105, at 60–61, 70 n.60.  
 188. J. Paul Singleton, Can You Really Have Too Much of a Good Thing?: 
How Benevolent Tax Policies Have Attributed to the Explosion of Health Care 
Costs and How New Policies Threaten to do More of the Same, 8 DEPAUL BUS. 
& COM. L.J. 305, 332 (2010) (“[U]sing pre-tax dollars to save for health insur-
ance is not a benefit for the 36.3% of Americans who, as of 2008, did not owe 
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in risk stratification, thereby behaving more like the troubled 
pre-ACA individual market, the equity problem with such a 
large and unevenly distributed tax subsidy becomes increasing-
ly unjustifiable.189
III.  BUILDING A BETTER STATUTORY SCHEME FOR 
WELLNESS PROGRAMS   
  
The implicit message in wellness programs, that people 
must take responsibility for their own health, may have a 
prominent role to play in the future of the American health 
care system,190
A. INTERPRETING STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
 but the legal and policy problems presented by 
wellness programs raise the question of whether these pro-
grams are an appropriate avenue for health promotion and dis-
ease prevention. The remainder of this Note suggests that in 
order to establish clearer and fairer objectives, the wellness 
program statutory language must be amended to: (1) clarify 
which types of wellness programs are permissible under the 
statute; and (2) relax the financial pressure to achieve health 
status factors. 
The language in the ACA’s wellness provisions should be 
amended to prevent the law from contradicting itself. As the 
law is presently formulated, even though wellness programs 
are designated as an exception to HIPAA’s health status anti-
discrimination provisions, the wellness provisions themselves 
prohibit the programs from discrimination based upon health 
status. This contradiction could be avoided by removing the 
language, “is not a subterfuge for discriminating based on a 
health status factor” from 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (Supp. 
2012). The subsection would then state that a program is rea-
 
any income tax at the end of the year. Moreover, low-income tax payers are 
the least likely to be able to afford the rising costs of health insurance. The tax 
exclusion, then, would provide relatively little benefit to these households even 
if their marginal tax rate exceeded zero. Ultimately, this exclusion is little 
more than a subsidy for the wealthy who receive generous employer-provided 
health insurance, while those most in need of assistance receive no comparable 
subsidy through the exclusion.” (emphasis added)).  
 189. Cf. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 176, at 142 (“In contrast to in-
surers in the individual market, most employers engaged in relatively little 
risk classification prior to ACA. For this reason, ACA does little to alter the 
risk-classification landscape with respect to employers.”). 
 190. For a discussion about the responsibility to be as healthy as you can, 
see Baker, supra note 63, at 1602–06. 
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sonably designed to promote health or prevent disease “if the 
program has a reasonable chance of improving the health of, or 
preventing disease in, participating individuals, and it is not 
overly burdensome and is not highly suspect in the method 
chosen to promote health and prevent disease.”191
This change would certainly not remove all ambiguity but 
it would eliminate a facial contradiction. A plaintiff challenging 
the nexus between a wellness program and its reasonable 
chance of improving participants’ health must make a fact-
intensive case. This standard sets an especially high bar for the 
plaintiff because the administrative guidance acknowledges 
that this nexus does not have to be grounded in sound scientific 
evidence.
  
192
It is a trickier piece of statutory interpretation to reconcile 
the current wellness program exception to HIPAA’s antidis-
crimination provisions with a prohibition on acting as a subter-
fuge for discrimination. It is also unnecessary. This prohibition 
does not add anything to the statute except an inconsistency 
that could be used to challenge any wellness program condi-
tioning rewards on health status factors. Congress did not in-
tend this result as evidenced by the statutory wellness provi-
sions’ examples of acceptable programs that condition rewards 
on health status factors.
 Furthermore, it is well within a court’s ability and 
experience to evaluate whether a program is overly burden-
some or highly suspect in its method. Under this new construc-
tion, a wellness program conditioning financial rewards on 
health status factors can indisputably qualify for the antidis-
crimination exception and be judged to be neither overly bur-
densome nor highly suspect in its method—a difficult determi-
nation under the current statutory language.  
193
Perhaps Congress intended the word discrimination to 
have different meanings in HIPAA and the ACA. It is probably 
possible to construct a definitional distinction between the use 
of discrimination in the two contexts. Alternatively, simply 
eliminating the requirement that a program not be a subter-
fuge for discrimination would remove this contradiction and al-
low programs to be developed as Congress intended. Requiring 
 
 
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 300 gg-4(j)(3)(B) (Supp. 2012). 
 192. See Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in 
the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,018 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
 193. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3) ex. 3 (2012) (permitting a wellness 
program that provides a “premium rebate” for participants who obtain a 
healthy cholesterol level).  
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a program to not be overly burdensome, or highly suspect in its 
methods, probably provides a comparable check on overly ag-
gressive wellness programs. Striking this language would make 
the statute better reflect Congress’s purpose and avoid unnec-
essary litigation over statutory ambiguity. While this textual 
fix addresses some technical inconsistencies, Congress’s con-
flicted relationship with health status discrimination is indica-
tive of a larger paradox posed by post-ACA wellness programs 
that is addressed next.  
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF EASING THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE OF 
WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
Presently, there are too many incentives for employers to 
implement wellness programs with an aggressive financial-
rewards structure and not enough evidence to support the effi-
cacy of these programs. These incentives could exacerbate 
health and economic disparities by making health care cover-
age more expensive for the people who need money and cover-
age most.  
An important counterargument is that this critique of 
wellness programs assumes that the programs do not actually 
decrease the cost of health insurance.194
 
 194. Cf. Ezra Klein, The Promise and Peril of Wellness, WONKBLOG (Oct. 
16, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the 
-promise-and-peril-of-wellness/2011/08/25/gIQAGzPfkL_blog.html (discussing 
how spending on employee health care decreased after the implementation of 
a comprehensive wellness program, including differential premium pricing 
based upon health status, at the Cleveland Clinic).  
 If the programs are 
successful then the cost-savings may be passed along to policy-
holders of all health statuses. If cost-savings via improved 
health status are both substantial enough and returned to poli-
cyholders (as opposed to being absorbed administratively or 
distributed as profits), then theoretically, everyone in a group 
health insurance plan could pay enough less that wellness pro-
gram premium price differentials will function as genuine bo-
nuses. If the programs are truly this effective, people with poor 
health statuses may benefit from wellness programs despite 
any differential pricing because of systemically lower health in-
surance costs. Assuming that wellness programs that account 
for health status can decrease health insurance premium prices 
enough to offset any reward, the ACA’s support for increased 
pricing differentials may nonetheless benefit policyholders with 
poor health statuses.  
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To address this counterargument, the effectiveness of fi-
nancially incented wellness programs must be evaluated. Eval-
uation considerations include the length of wellness program 
implementation before evaluation, the demographics of the in-
sured population pre- and post-wellness program, and of course 
determining the appropriate metrics to measure cost and 
health status. Alone, these variables are moving targets.195
This Note does not opine upon the effectiveness of wellness 
programs beyond making the observation that implementation 
is in its infancy and program evaluation and comparative effec-
tiveness analysis is far from established.
 It is 
a daunting task indeed to combine them into an accurate 
measure of wellness program effectiveness.  
196
The ACA’s increase in permissible financial rewards 
should be scaled back considering the rapidly rising premium 
costs and the potential for a difference of thousands of dollars 
between what healthy and unhealthy group members pay.
 Keeping this in 
mind, a conservative approach to the creation of programs with 
financial incentives is warranted. Policymakers should be hesi-
tant to tamper too much with the heavily-subsidized large 
group insurance market that has been traditionally adept at 
risk-spreading. 
197 As 
premium prices escalate, even HIPAA’s 20% cap may be exces-
sive. A 10% to 15% limit would still allow employers to provide 
hundreds of dollars in savings to incentivize employees to 
achieve healthier outcomes and be less likely to cause excessive 
financial strain.198
 
 195. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can 
Generate Savings, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1, 2 (2010), available at http://content 
.healthaffairs.org/content/29/2/304.full (describing some of the methodological 
difficulties in evaluating wellness programs). 
 This precise limit is admittedly somewhat 
arbitrary, but it better reflects a conservative approach without 
eliminating the programs entirely. A more stringent limit on 
the magnitude of incentives decreases the potential for well-
ness programs to exacerbate existing disparities (albeit, with a 
corresponding weakened incentive for successful wellness pro-
gram participation), but still fails to address the problem artic-
 196. Madison et al., supra note 5, at 453. See generally Mariner, supra note 
13, at 304–05 (explaining some of the methodological challenges in evaluating 
wellness programs).  
 197. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.  
 198. Wellness incentives should not impose an “undue burden” under 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (Supp. 2012), though no objective measure or further 
guidance is provided to clarify what this precisely means.  
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ulated by the public health paradigm: health status is the 
product of more variables than and individuals’ motivation to 
be healthy.  
One alternative to capping the financial incentive at 15% of 
the premium price would be to require employers with greater 
financial incentives to participate in pilot programs.199 Employ-
ers using wellness programs with incentives beyond 15% of the 
purchase price could be required to systematically collect data 
used to monitor the efficacy of the program over time. These pi-
lot programs could be used to explore and compare the effec-
tiveness of financial rewards of up to 50% of the purchase price. 
When there is evidence to indicate that programs with greater 
rewards are effective enough to return net savings to the group, 
the time will be ripe for broad application of the ACA’s wellness 
provisions.200
  CONCLUSION   
 Until then, the best and fairest option when in-
troducing risk stratification into the employer insurance mar-
ket is the conservative one.  
At first glance, wellness programs seem like an innocuous 
and innovative way to incentivize people to improve their 
health. Upon closer examination, however, the issue is more 
complex. The manner in which the ACA has structured and 
promoted these programs creates cause for concern on numer-
ous levels. Wellness programs struggle to marry the competing 
ideologies of health promotion through financial incentives and 
expanded and equitable access to affordable health care. The 
statute’s attempt to do so creates a great deal of tension with 
existing laws and policies both internal and external to the 
statute. Additionally, the wellness provisions’ failure to 
acknowledge the complexity of health status determinants 
while increasing the economic pressure to participate in well-
ness programs is concerning. There is a strong possibility that 
the ACA’s wellness program framework will upset the relative 
stability of the group insurance market by exacerbating both 
health and economic disparities rather than improving health 
and preventing disease. The financial incentives provided by 
 
 199. Cf. id. § 300gg-4(l)(1) (providing for a ten-state demonstration project 
piloting wellness programs in state individual markets).  
 200. Cf. id. § 300gg-4(l)(2) (providing for the expansion of the ten-state in-
dividual market wellness program demonstration project if the Secretaries of 
Health and Human Services, the Treasury, and Labor determine that the 
demonstration project is effective).  
  
1506 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1474 
 
wellness program should be reined in, rather than expanded, to 
prevent burdening the marginalized populations that the ACA 
is supposed to assist, at least until a more realistic assessment 
of the actual effect of the widespread implementation of these 
programs is possible.  
 
